Thursday, March 11, 2010

30-4-1975

Tấm hình tren chiếc trực thăng HU1H thuộc phi đoàn 219 . Phi hành đòan gồm cựư th/tá Trần ngọc Thạnh , th/tá Hùynh xuân Thu
cơ phi Đổng minh Sanh , hành khách gồm : Th/tá Huỳnh văn Phố vợ và 2 con , th/tá Đinh thế Khúc vợ và 2 con , th/si N V Khánh vợ và 5 con
Bà th/tá Phạm văn Lương pđ 259 và 2 con , tr/uy Nghiêu pđ 259 , bà Nguyển văn Thạch phi đoàn 817 , mẹ ,2 em và 3 con. Cọng thêm vợ
và 2 con của th/tá Thạnh vợ và 2 của th/tá Thu tất cả gồm 20 ngừơi lớn và 19 trẻ em trên một chuyến bay lịch sữ.



Celebrating Freedom in America aboard the USS Midway
Holiday Inn on the Bay



On April 30, 2010 at 12 Noon a special ceremony called "Celebrating Freedom in America" commemorating the 35th anniversary of the Fall of Saigon will be held upon the USS Midway Museum in San Diego Harbor. This celebration will honor the people of Vietnam as well as the crew of the USS Midway and their participation in the events of April 30, 1975 in an operation known today as Operation Frequent Wind. Come join the festivities with this package at the Holiday Inn on the Bay.
The Holiday Inn is located just a few short blocks from the USS Midway and walking distance to the great shopping, dining and nightlife of downtown San Diego and the Gaslamp District. Every room at this hotel has a private balcony offering fantastic views of the San Diego Bay or skyline. Enhance your San Diego vacation getaway with tickets to the Maritime Museum located directly across the street from the hotel or other favorite attractions like SeaWorld, the World Famous San Diego Zoo or the museums of Balboa Park.





PACKAGE INCLUDES
OPTIONAL ITEMS
  • Maritime Museum of San Diego - General Admission [ see details ]

  • SeaWorld San Diego - SeaWorld San Diego 7-Day Pass [ see details ]

  • Passport to Balboa Park - Passport to Balboa Park with Best Value Zoo Admission [ see details ]

  • Museum of San Diego History - General Admission [ see details ]

  • Old Town Trolley/Seal Tour Combo Ticket - Old Town Trolley/Seal Tour Combo Ticket [ see details ]





Holiday Inn on the Bay
San Diego, CA


The Holiday Inn San Diego Hotel On the Bay invites you to experience panoramic views of the San Diego Bay and Downtown city skyline. Walk along the bayfront, or just take in the splendor of our beautiful harbor from your balcony. Popular for it's proximity to fine restaurants, theaters, museums and...
More Hotel Info · Location Info & Map




USS Midway Museum - Museum AdmissionPrint at Home Tickets Available!


San Diego, CACategory: Arts & Culture


General Admission to the USS Midway. Guided tours are not included.

Active Duty with ID are free. Children 5 & under are free.
Attraction Info · Location Info & Map · Terms & Conditions




Maritime Museum of San Diego - General Admission


San Diego, CACategory: Arts & Culture


Includes admission to the Maritime Museum of San Diego's fleet of historic ships and the exhibits on board.

* Includes admission to the Star of India, Berkeley, Medea, HMS Surprise and the B-39 Soviet submarine.
Attraction Info · Location Info & Map · Terms & Conditions




SeaWorld San Diego - SeaWorld San Diego 7-Day Pass


San Diego, CACategory: Theme Parks & Attractions


Print at Home Tickets Available! - Unlimited admission to SeaWorld San Diego for 7 consecutive days.
Attraction Info · Location Info & Map · Terms & Conditions




Passport to Balboa Park - Passport to Balboa Park with Best Value Zoo Admission


San Diego, CACategory: Arts & Culture


This passport offers visitors the chance to experience fourteen museums and One-day Best Value admission to the world famous San Diego Zoo!
  • Please note: Passport is valid for 7 days from first day of issue and is valid for one admission per museum/attraction. Includes One-day Best Value admission, guided bus tour and Skyfari aerial tram.

  • Please note: The Science of...Aliens exhibition at the San Diego Air & Space Museum requires a separate admission of $9.75 for adults and $6.75 for youth. Admission to the permanent collections of the Air & Spa.

Attraction Info · Location Info & Map · Terms & Conditions




Museum of San Diego History - General Admission


San Diego, CACategory: Arts & Culture


Includes admission to the San Diego Historical Society’s exhibitions at the Museum of San Diego History.
Attraction Info · Location Info & Map · Terms & Conditions




Old Town Trolley/Seal Tour Combo Ticket - Old Town Trolley/Seal Tour Combo Ticket


San Diego, CACategory: Deals & Combo Tickets


A narrated sightseeing tour on a motorized trolley to the most celebrated and exciting places in San Diego. With on/off privileges at each stop, make it an all day tour or take a continuous 2-hour tour. In addition, you will also be viewing "America's Finest City" from a totally different perspective....on a "Boat with Wheels"! Experience San Diego the way it was intended - from Sea and Land. Climb aboard our Coast Guard approved Hydra-Terra amphibious vehicles for the adventure of a lifetime!
Attraction Info · Location Info & Map · Terms & Conditions



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060
Chapter 5: The Final Curtain, 1973 - 1975

During the period from 29 March 1973 to 30 April 1975, the Defense Attaché Office (DAO), Saigon, administered the American military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. Limited by the Paris Agreement to 50 or fewer military personnel, the activity was staffed predominantly by civilians and contractors. The DAO was responsible for providing supplies and material to the 42,000-man Vietnamese Navy, which operated 672 amphibious ships and craft, 20 mine warfare vessels, 450 patrol craft, 56 service craft, and 242 junks. The quality of personnel in the naval service remained adequate over the two-year period. A drastic cut in U.S. financial support, however, hurt the navy's overall readiness. The U.S. Congress appropriated only $700 million for fiscal year 1975, forcing the Vietnamese Navy to reduce its overall operations by 50 percent and its river combat and patrol activities by 70 percent. To conserve scarce ammunition and fuel, Saigon laid up over 600 river and harbor craft and 22 ships. The enemy did not target the waterways during 1973 and 1974, but such would not be the case in 1975 when the coastal areas of South Vietnam became the war's main operational theater.



Naval Evacuation of I and II Corps

The final test of strength between the Republic of Vietnam and its Communist antagonists that many observers had long predicted occurred in the early months of 1975. Seeking to erode the government's military position in the vulnerable II Corps area, on 10 March Communist forces attacked Ban Me Thuot, the capital of isolated Darlac Province, and routed the South Vietnamese troops there. The debacle convinced President Nguyen Van Thieu that even the strategic Pleiku and Kontum Provinces to the north could not be held and must be evacuated. Accordingly, on the fifteenth, government forces and thousands of civilian refugees began an exodus toward Tuy Hoa on the coast but that degenerated into a panicked flight when the enemy interdicted the main road. The enemy dispersed or destroyed many of the South Vietnamese II Corps units in this catastrophe.

These events set off a chain reaction as the demoralized South Vietnamese troops abandoned port after port along the South Vietnamese coast to swiftly advancing North Vietnamese forces. Learning of the disaster in II Corps and confused by contradictory deployment orders from Saigon, the defenders of I Corps also began to crack. Giving up Hue on 25 March, Vietnamese troops retreated in disorder toward Danang. The Vietnamese Navy rescued thousands of men cut off on the coast southeast of Hue, but heavy weather and the general confusion limited the sealift's effectiveness. On the previous day (24 March) government units evacuated Tam Ky and Quang Ngai in southern I Corps and also streamed toward Danang. Simultaneously, the navy transported elements of the 2d Division from Chu Lai to Re Island 20 miles offshore. With five North Vietnamese divisions pressing the remnants of the South Vietnamese armed forces and hundreds of thousands of refugees into Danang, order in the city disintegrated. Looting, arson, and riot ruled the city as over two million people sought a way out of the ever-closing trap.

During this period of growing chaos in South Vietnam, the U.S. Navy readied for evacuation operations. On 24 March, the Military Sealift Command (MSC), formerly the Military Sea Transportation Service, dispatched the following tugs, pulling a total of six barges, from Vung Tau toward Danang:

Asiatic Stamina
Chitose Maru
Osceola
Pawnee
Shibaura Maru

On 25 March, the following ships were alerted for imminent evacuation operations in South Vietnam:


SS American Racer
SS Green Forest
SS Green Port
SS Green Wave
SS Pioneer Commander
SS Pioneer Contender
SS Transcolorado
USNS Greenville Victory
USNS Sgt Andrew Miller
USNS Sgt. Truman Kimbro

Noncombatants were chosen for the mission because the Paris Agreement prohibited the entry of U.S. Navy or other military forces into the country.

With the arrival at Danang of Pioneer Contender on 27 March, the massive U.S. sea evacuation of I and II Corps began. During the next several days four of the five barge-pulling tugs and Sgt. Andrew Miller, Pioneer Commander, and American Challenger put in at the port. The vessels embarked U.S. Consulate, MSC, and other American personnel and thousands of desperate Vietnamese soldiers and civilians. When the larger ships were filled to capacity with 5,000 to 8,000 passengers, they individually sailed for Cam Ranh Bay further down the coast. By 30 March order in the city of Danang and in the harbor had completely broken down. Armed South Vietnamese deserters fired on civilians and each other, the enemy fired on the American vessels and sent sappers ahead to destroy port facilities, and refugees sought to board any boat or craft afloat. The hundreds of vessels traversing the harbor endangered the safety of all. Weighing these factors, the remaining U.S. and Vietnamese Navy ships loaded all the people they could and steamed for the south. MSC ships carried over 30,000 refugees from Danang in the four-day operation. American Challenger stayed offshore to pick up stragglers until day's end on 30 March, when the North Vietnamese overran Danang.

In quick succession, the major ports in II Corps fell to the lightly resisted Communist advance. Hampered by South Vietnamese shelling of Qui Nhon, Pioneer Commander, Greenville Victory, Korean-flag LST Boo Heung Pioneer, and three tugs were unable to load evacuees at this city, which fell on 31 March. The speed of the South Vietnamese collapse and the enemy's quick exploitation of it limited the number of refugees rescued from Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. Before the latter port fell on 2 April, however, Boo Heung Pioneer and Pioneer Commander brought 11,500 passengers on board and put out to sea.

Initially, Cam Ranh Bay was chosen as the safe haven for these South Vietnamese troops and civilians transported by MSC. But, even Cam Ranh Bay was soon in peril. Between 1 and 4 April, many of the refugees just landed were reembarked for further passage south and west to Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Siam. Greenville Victory, Sgt. Andrew Miller, American Challenger, and Green Port each embarked between 7,000 and 8,000 evacuees for the journey. Pioneer Contender sailed with 16,700 people filling every conceivable space from stem to stern. Crowding and the lack of sufficient food and water among the 8,000 passengers on board Transcolorado led a number of armed Vietnamese marines to demand they be discharged at the closer port of Vung Tau. The ship's master complied to avoid bloodshed, but this crisis highlighted the need for the Navy to provide better security.

As the magnitude of the calamity in I and II Corps became apparent, the Seventh Fleet deployed elements of the Amphibious Task Force (Task Force 76) to a position off Nha Trang. Because of the political restrictions on the use of American military forces in South Vietnam and the availability of MSC resources, however, Washington limited the naval contingent, then designated the Refugee Assistance Task Group (Task Group 76.8), to a supporting role. For the most part, this entailed command coordination, surface escort duties, and the dispatch of 50-man Marine security details to the MSC flotilla at sea. By 2 April, the task group--Dubuque, Durham (LKA 114), Frederick (LST 1184), and the Task Force 76 flagship Blue Ridge (LCC 19)--was monitoring operations at Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang. That same night the first Marine security force to do so boarded Pioneer Contender. A second contingent was airlifted to Transcolorado on the fourth. Dissatisfied with the condition of reception facilities on Phu Quoc and ill-tempered after the arduous passage south, armed passengers in Greenville Victory forced the master to sail to Vung Tau. Guided missile cruiser Long Beach (CGN 9) and escort Reasoner (DE 1063) intercepted the ship and stood by to aid the crew, but the voyage and debarkation of passengers proceeded uneventfully. In addition, Commander Task Group 76.8 immediately concentrated Dubuque, guided missile destroyer Cochrane (DDG 21), storeship Vega (AF 59), and the three ships of Amphibious Ready Group Alpha at Phu Quoc to position security detachments on each of the MSC vessels and to resupply the refugees with food, water, and medicines. Naval personnel also served as translators to ease the registration process. By 10 April, all ships at Phu Quoc were empty, thus bringing to a close the intracoastal sealift of 130,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese citizens. With stabilization of the fighting front at Xuan Loc east of Saigon and the Communists preparation for the final offensive, the need to evacuate by sea diminished. By the fourteenth all naval vessels had departed the waters off South Vietnam and returned to other duties.

Eagle Pull

Meanwhile, the Seventh Fleet focused its attention on Cambodia, in imminent danger of falling to the Communist Khmer Rouge guerrillas. Since 1970, the United States had aided the government of President Lon Nol in its struggle with the indigenous enemy and with North Vietnamese forces arrayed along the border with South Vietnam. The American support included a bombing campaign launched from Navy carriers and Air Force bases as far away as Guam and the delivery to Phnom Penh of arms, ammunition, and essential commodities through airlift and Mekong River convoy. Material assistance to the 6,000-man Cambodian Navy included the transfer of coastal patrol craft, PBRs, converted amphibious craft for river patrol and mine warfare, and auxiliary vessels. Despite this aid, by early 1975 the Communists in Cambodia controlled every population center but Phnom Penh, the capital. As the enemy tightened his ring around the city, the resistance of Cambodian government forces began to crumble.

Concluding that it was only a matter of time before all was lost in Cambodia, American leaders prepared to evacuate American and allied personnel from Phnom Penh. Fleet commanders revised and updated long-standing plans and alerted their forces for this special mission, designated Operation Eagle Pull. On 3 March 1975, Amphibious Ready Group Alpha (Task Group 76.4), and the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (Task Group 79.4) embarked and arrived at a designated station off Kompong Som (previously Sihanoukville) in the Gulf of Siam. By 11 April, the force consisted of amphibious ships Okinawa, Vancouver, and Thomaston (LSD 28), escorted by Edson (DD 946), Henry B. Wilson (DDG 7), Knox (DE 1052), and Kirk (DE 1087). In addition, Hancock disembarked her normal complement of fixed-wing aircraft and took on Marine Heavy Lift Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 463 for the operation. Anticipating the need to rescue as many as 800 evacuees, naval leaders decided that they needed all of the squadron's 25 CH-53, CH-46, AH-1J, and UH-1E helicopters and Okinawa's 22 CH-53, AH-1J, and UH-1Es of HMH-462. The amphibious group also carried the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, which would defend the evacuation landing zone near the U.S. Embassy, and reinforced naval medical-surgical teams to care for any casualties. Land-based U.S. Air Force helicopters and tactical aircraft were also on hand to back up the naval effort. Commander U.S. Support Activities Group/7th Air Force (COMUSSAG) was in overall command of the evacuation operation.

On 7 April 1975, the American command put Amphibious Ready Group Alpha on three-hour alert and positioned the force off the Cambodian coast. In the early morning hours of 12 April Washington ordered execution of the daring mission. At 0745 local time, Okinawa began launching helicopters in three waves to carry the 360-man Marine ground security force to the landing zone. One hour later, after traversing 100 miles of hostile territory, the initial wave set down near the embassy and the Marines quickly established a defensive perimeter.

Within the next two hours, U.S. officials assembled the evacuees and quickly loaded them on Okinawa and Hancock helicopters. Because many already had left Cambodia by other means prior to the twelfth, the evacuees numbered only 276. The group included U.S. Ambassador John Gunther Dean, other American diplomatic personnel, the acting president of Cambodia, senior Cambodian government leaders and their families, and members of the news media. In all, 82 U.S., 159 Cambodian, and 35 other nationals were rescued.

By 1041 all the evacuees had been lifted out, and little more than one-half hour later the ground security force also was airborne and heading out to sea. At 1224 all aircraft and personnel were safely on board Amphibious Ready Group Alpha ships. Although one Khmer Rouge 75-millimeter shell landed near the embassy landing zone, no casualties were suffered during the entire operation. The following day, task group helicopters flew the evacuated personnel to Thailand and the naval force set sail for Subic Bay. Thus through detailed planning, preparation, and precise execution, the joint evacuation force successfully accomplished the military mission in Cambodia.

The Fall of South Vietnam

The experience gained in Operation Eagle Pull and in the refugee evacuations from South Vietnam's I and II Corps served the fleet well when the Republic of Vietnam, after 20 years of struggle, collapsed under the Communist onslaught. During the latter half of April, U.S. naval leaders prepared ships and men for the final evacuation of American and allied personnel from South Vietnam. The ships of the MSC flotilla were cleaned, restocked with food, water, and medicine; and deployed off Vung Tau in readiness. In addition, Marine security detachments embarked in each of the vessels and prepared to disarm boarding refugees and ensure order. Rincon (T-AOG-77) stood by to provide fuel to Vietnamese and American ships making the exodus from South Vietnam's waters.

The Seventh Fleet also marshalled its forces in the Western Pacific. Between 18 and 24 April 1975, with the loss of Saigon imminent, the Navy concentrated off Vung Tau a vast assemblage of ships under Commander Task Force 76.

Task Force 76
Blue Ridge (command ship)
Task Group 76.4 (Movement Transport Group Alpha)
Okinawa
Vancouver
Thomaston
Peoria (LST 1183)
Task Group 76.5 (Movement Transport Group Bravo)
Dubuque
Durham
Frederick
Task Group 76.9 (Movement Transport Group Charlie)
Anchorage (LSD 36)
Denver (LPD 9)
Duluth (LPD 6)
Mobile (LKA 115)

The task force was joined by Hancock and Midway, carrying Navy, Marine, and Air Force helicopters; Seventh Fleet flagship Oklahoma City; amphibious ships Mount Vernon (LSD 39), Barbour County (LST 1195), and Tuscaloosa (LST 1187); and eight destroyer types for naval gunfire, escort, and area defense. The Enterprise and Coral Sea carrier attack groups of Task Force 77 in the South China Sea provided air cover while Task Force 73 ensured logistic support. The Marine evacuation contingent, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (Task Group 79.1), consisted of three battalion landing teams, four helicopter squadrons, support units, and the deployed security detachments.

After a dogged defense at Xuan Loc, the South Vietnamese forces defending the approaches to Saigon finally gave way on 21 April. With the outcome of the conflict clear, President Thieu resigned the same day. On the 29th, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces closed on the capital, easily pushing through the disintegrating Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Although U.S. and South Vietnamese leaders had delayed ordering an evacuation, for fear of sparking a premature collapse, the time for decision was now at hand.

At 1108 local time on 29 April 1975, Commander Task Force 76 received the order to execute Operation Frequent Wind (initially Talon Vise), the evacuation of U.S. personnel and Vietnamese who might suffer as a result of their past service to the allied effort. At 1244, from a position 17 nautical miles from the Vung Tau Peninsula, Hancock launched the first helicopter wave. Over two hours later, these aircraft landed at the primary landing zone in the U.S. Defense Attache Office compound in Saigon. Once the ground security force (2d Battalion, 4th Marines) established a defensive cordon, Task Force 76 helicopters began lifting out the thousands of American, Vietnamese, and third-country nationals. The process was fairly orderly. By 2100 that night, the entire group of 5,000 evacuees had been cleared from the site. The Marines holding the perimeter soon followed.

The situation was much less stable at the U.S. Embassy. There, several hundred prospective evacuees were joined by thousands more who climbed fences and pressed the Marine guard in their desperate attempt to flee the city. Marine and Air Force helicopters, flying at night through ground fire over Saigon and the surrounding area, had to pick up evacuees from dangerously constricted landing zones at the embassy, one atop the building itself. Despite the problems, by 0500 on the morning of 30 April, U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin and 2,100 evacuees had been rescued from the Communist forces closing in. Only two hours after the last Marine security force element was extracted from the embassy, Communist tanks crashed through the gates of the nearby Presidential Palace. At the cost of two Marines killed in an earlier shelling of the Defense Attaché Office compound and two helicopter crews lost at sea, Task Force 76 rescued over 7,000 Americans and Vietnamese.

Meanwhile, out at sea, the initial trickle of refugees from Saigon had become a torrent. Vietnamese Air Force aircraft loaded with air crews and their families made for the naval task force. These incoming helicopters (most fuel-starved) and one T-41 trainer complicated the landing and takeoff of the Marine and Air Force helicopters shuttling evacuees. Ships of the task force recovered 41 Vietnamese aircraft, but another 54 were pushed over the side to make room on deck or ditched alongside by their frantic crews. Naval small craft rescued many Vietnamese from sinking helicopters, but some did not survive the ordeal.

This aerial exodus was paralleled by an outgoing tide of junks, sampans, and small craft of all types bearing a large number of the fleeing population. MSC tugs Harumi, Chitose Maru, Osceola, Shibaura Maru, and Asiatic Stamina pulled barges filled with people from Saigon port out to the MSC flotilla. There, the refugees were embarked, registered, inspected for weapons, and given a medical exam. Having learned well from the earlier operations, the MSC crews and Marine security personnel processed the new arrivals with relative efficiency. The Navy eventually transferred all Vietnamese refugees taken on board naval vessels to the MSC ships.

Another large contingent of Vietnamese was carried to safety by a flotilla of 26 Vietnamese Navy and other vessels. These ships concentrated off Son Island southwest of Vung Tau with 30,000 sailors, their families, and other civilians on board.

On the afternoon of 30 April, Task Force 76 and the MSC group moved away from the coast, all the while picking up more seaborne refugees. This effort continued the following day. Finally, when this human tide ceased on the evening of 2 May, Task Force 76, carrying 6,000 passengers; the MSC flotilla of Sgt Truman Kimbro, Sgt Andrew Miller, Greenville Victory, Pioneer Contender, Pioneer Commander, Green Forest, Green Port, American Challenger, and Boo Heung Pioneer, with 44,000 refugees; and the Vietnamese Navy group set sail for reception centers in the Philippines and Guam. Thus ended the U.S. Navy's role in the 25-year American effort to aid the Republic of Vietnam in its desperate fight for survival.



The final test of strength between the Republic of Vietnam and its Communist antagonists that many observers had long predicted occurred in the early months of 1975. Demoralized South Vietnamese troops abandoned port after port along the South Vietnamese coast to swiftly advancing North Vietnamese forces. With five North Vietnamese divisions pressing the remnants of the South Vietnamese armed forces and hundreds of thousands of refugees into Danang, order in the city disintegrated. During this period of growing chaos in South Vietnam, the U.S. Navy readied for evacuation operations. On 25 March 1975, a number of ships were alerted for imminent evacuation operations in South Vietnam. Noncombatants were chosen for the mission because the Paris Agreement prohibited the entry of US Navy or other military forces into the country.

With the arrival at Danang of Pioneer Contender on 27 March 1975, the massive U.S. sea evacuation of I and II Corps began. During the next several days four of the five barge-pulling tugs and Sgt. Andrew Miller, Pioneer Commander, and American Challenger put in at the port. The vessels embarked U.S. Consulate, MSC, and other American personnel and thousands of desperate Vietnamese soldiers and civilians. When the larger ships were filled to capacity with 5,000 to 8,000 passengers, they individually sailed for Cam Ranh Bay further down the coast. Hampered by South Vietnamese shelling of Qui Nhon, Pioneer Commander, Greenville Victory, Korean-flag LST Boo Heung Pioneer, and three tugs were unable to load evacuees at this city, which fell on 31 March. The speed of the South Vietnamese collapse and the enemy's quick exploitation of it limited the number of refugees rescued from Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. Before the latter port fell on 2 April, however, Boo Heung Pioneer and Pioneer Commander brought 11,500 passengers on board and put out to sea.

On the evening of 2 May 1975 the MSC flotilla of Sgt Truman Kimbro, Sgt Andrew Miller, Greenville Victory, Pioneer Contender, Pioneer Commander, Green Forest, Green Port, American Challenger, and Boo Heung Pioneer, with 44,000 refugees, set sail for reception centers in the Philippines and Guam. Thus ended the 25-year American effort to aid the Republic of Vietnam in its fight for survival.
















Thursday, February 11, 2010

Đám Tang Phu Nhân Đại Tá Đặng Văn Phước

 
 

 
Xin thap nen huong de chia buon cung gia dinh cua D/ Ta Dang Van Phuoc ,Cuu P / D Truong / PD 219 , Khong Doan Truong / KD 51 CT / SD1 KQ / Da Nang ve tin Hien The cua N T. D / Ta  D V Phuoc da that loc tai Vung Nam Cali .
K/B Tran Van Sua / Vancouver / Canada .

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

Phân Ưu


Được tin buồn phu nhân cựu Đ/Tá ĐẶNG VĂN PHƯỚC
Phi Đoàn Trưỡng Phi Đoàn 219 - Không Đoàn Trưởng Không Đoàn 51 Chiến Thuật /Sư Đoàn I Không Quân là :


Cụ Bà: HUỲNH THỊ BẢY
Pháp Danh: Sinh Diệu Thiện
Tạ thế ngày 6 tháng 2 năm 2010
Nhằm ngày 23 tháng Chạp năm Kỷ Sửu
Hưởng thọ 80 tuổi


Chúng tôi, Thân Hữu, Chiến Hữu thuộc Nha Kỹ Thuật, Hội Ái Hữu Quân Trường Đồng Đế Nha Trang.


Xin thành kính phân ưu cùng Đ/tá và Gia quyến.
Nguyện cầu hương linh cụ bà sớm siêu thăng cõi Niết Bàn.


Chiến Hữu Gia Đình Nha Kỹ Thuật
Hội Ái Hữu Quân Trường Đồng Đế Nha Trang

Đồng Thành Kính Phân Ưu

Tuesday, February 2, 2010

Kingbee over "Saigon" Trail


Kingbee over HCM Trail (part-1) Kingbee Project Delta Special Flight Group In the year 2.004, U S Media, the radio had announced the recovery of the full crewmembers- remains of The Vietnamese Air force: Lieutenant Long, Lt Tung, and Master Sergeant Lanh. These were all my dear comrades who’d been listed as Missing- In-Action in 1966; the numbers matched up, a total of Three Queen Bees. Yet they would be making that final journey in flag-draped coffins, carried by solemn honors guard of our brothers in arms. No, it wouldn’t be easy at all. They were buried with military honors at Arlington-Cemetery. Yet as I listened to that song, I mourned our lost comrades who would help me remember the lightest moments of the darkest hours, and details of each man’s life that I could hold in my memories. I nodded and thanked them silently. Now my last salute to theirs final resting place in a clearing surrounded by maple and pine trees. Alas! We never seem to learn from our forgiveness for what they had done. “Sacrifices often are unappreciated by those who benefit from them” I was angry about having sacrificed my young to the Wise-Men’s stratagem (American-First) for many years; my war flying experience still remained like a huge undigested lump in the back of my mind. I did not know what to do with it, when someone asked it with my own know-how-concept. If the real power from US administration had kept their promises, Southern Vietnamese might now be enjoying prosperity and democracy similar to what has developed in South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Even now I became a green-fresh US citizen, but still very clear to me that I am not among the self-loathing Americans who notice people in other countries looking to us for leadership and see nothing but neocolonialism and imperialism; I accept the premise that the United States has a legitimate, even inescapable, role to play in the world today.) Aerial photos on HCM Trail by Helicopter H.34 on treetop snapshot: Vietnam is a vastly diverse land. In the South a vast flooded Mekong Delta, broad coastal plains, thick mangrove swamp, tangled jungles, and it has steep mountains chain from North to South; so every year having flood. The jungle was too dense for large operations, but pretty good suitable hidden place for our SOG reconnaissance teams and the enemy too. You had to literally hack your way through vines and thick foliage, moving very slowly, mostly in small units like squad, team-sized, platoon-sized, may be company-sized patrols. Fighting in triple-canopy rain forest teaches you how to fight in triple-canopy rain forest. Fighting in mountains teaches you how to fight in mountains. And you should learn a lot simply shooting and getting shot at a lot, and working closely with others like team-work on a combat mission. But there isn’t a great deal of carryover from any of that one to the other. The biggest lesson, in fact, is learning how to be open to surprising new experiences a then turning that openness into resourceful and creative ways of dealing with the challenges you face. Recon-team was to interdict the North Vietnamese troops coming down the HCM Trail through Laos and Cambodia and infiltrating through the mountain and rugged terrain of the jungles into the populated regions near the coast. Recon-team did actually encounter large numbers of the enemy in the jungle, but they reported to forward operational base the detail information for bombardment, avoiding in fight contact, except for self-defense.

Their mission was to search for indications of them, their infiltration routes, or base camps or other places they might be using as sanctuaries; and they frequently found unoccupied enemy positions, often clever bunkers tunneled under thick bamboo clumps, providing them with a natural cover so why in battle of Ap-Bac 1963 the enemy had a safe cover in the lest casualty.
At Khe-Sanh, today June 14, two helicopters H.34 assigned to U.S Project-Delta Special Force, unmarked camouflage by color match with mountainous wild-leaves. The weather is OK for this season just light fog will clear very soon. The morning breeze shed out from stone mountain bringing enough cool; surrounding thick foliages were standstill, now and then the fresh sea-wind floating to mainland carried some warmer humidity, few cotton cumulus drifting to west hanging on the crest of mountain; higher some cirrus stay-unmoved in the clear blue-sky demonstrated the weather today should be very good for our aerial photos. We will to compete with higher altitude photos of Woodo R.F.101 and U.2 in contrast to treetop helicopter H.34. With this weather, I feel convinced that might God formed for us appeasing our anxiety. Yes, we plunged over ‘razing-mode- flight’ along HCM Trail and a foremost is snap-shot over Group 559, forward operational base headquarter [Oscar Eight]. In the mission clearance order recommended that we must take picture from west DMZ to the South at Kham Duc, and Ben Het. But I can’t do it, in-fact the very hot spot like Oscar-Eight, I must go this first and the rest later, I don’t want the enemy being ready for welcome us with every kind of anti-aircraft artilleries! About 40 kilometers northwest of South Vietnam is the Ashau-valley, Oscar Eight encompassed the Highway 922 turnoff from Highway 92. More USAF planes were downed at that road junction than any place in Laos which isn’t surprising since burrowed deep into the hills of Oscar Eight, defended by belts of antiaircraft guns, was North Vietnamese General Vo Bam’ 559 Transportation Group’s forward headquarter. This is the HCM Trail’s Control Center. We frequently inserted recon-team over-there, refocused on its operations across the border and tapered off in country missions except in the Ashau-valley which remained SOG haunt, situated beyond a barrier of imposing mountains that masked it from coastal enclaves 60 kilometers away at Phu-Bai and Da-Nang. The Ashau-valley stretched 35 kilometers northwest to southeast ending at Atep high land on the Laotian border. 3 kilometers wide in places, the Ashau bottom was grassy, flat and so open it was eerie; flying overhead you could feel eyes following you. Two abandoned airfields and three ghost camps haunted the valley floor, while its major road highway 548 connected with Laotian highway 922 from adjacent Laotian base areas the North Vietnamese built a network of 40 high-speed trails into the valley.

Northern Ashau’ Tam-Boi mountain contained immense chambers hewn from solid rock and fitted with heavy iron door, so well constructed that they withstood B.52 strikes. The plan was to insert at dusk so the enemy would have no daylight left to dispatch a reaction force or trackers, giving recon-team a full night’s head start. If they stumbled into enemy on the LZ, my courage Queen-Bee pilots would swoop in to extract them while the Huey gun-ships fired mini-guns and explosive rockets for air closed support. In March, 1966 at dusk, when Queen Bee inserted at very hot LZ right in enemy’s heartland. Immediately alerted emergency mission, our Queen Bee plunged in the shower of bullets AK47, picking-up Sergeant Brown and Huston, another Queen Bee dropped rope-ladder due to no space for LZ, picking-up Alan Boyer meanwhile under shower-bullets of AK47, Boyer got hit and fall. Dead or alive, he was in enemy hands. In the middle, 1966, one recon team was encountered a concentrated NVA ambushed. One hour fighting, later, team tried to hide to a hill crest, where there were some rock-stones easy to defend and preferred to Queen Bee pilots to put one landing-gear for picking them up. Apparently, few of them were wounded they would suicide by frustrated captured in the daylight. At night U.S pilots would gave-up. Lieutenant Hung, nickname “mustache”, by himself, an alone Queen-Bee, no copilot, no crew-chief, no door gun, in the dark of night, but just the very himself inserted them in, his conscience pricks him and his knew-how where-about a team located spot. He landed one gear on a hill crest slope picking-up all team members in the red glaring light of from every individual bullets gun, from everywhere concentrated to spot-light LZ. At last, an unmarked H.34 landing on operational home base with 88 holes of AK.47- “unbelievable” Say Major Scotty Crerar: “neither impossible ground fire nor unflyable-weather stopped Queen-Bee pilots…They were absolutely fearless!”

“…An English-speaking North Vietnamese officer told Glenn to watch carefully, then they cut Paul Miguez’s belly open, and his intestines fell to the ground. The officer took a flame-thrower from one of his men, stuck the nozzle in Miguez’s stomach and literally melted him alive, burning him horribly while the young specialist four watched. The NVA officer told him to tell his Green-Beret friends that this is what waited for them in Route 559 [Ho Chi Minh Trail] along corridor Laotian/ Vietnam. A number of recon-men doubted the story, thinking perhaps the One-Two had hallucinated; but they knew never to discount anything. A visiting SOG lieutenant colonel from Danang badgered the traumatized youth, even calling him coward. Then he turned his bile on Zabitosky, demanding to know why he hadn’t landed, and when he was told the Huey had been shot full of holes, he called Zabitosky a coward, too, why the Queen-Bee fearless, carried it out?. “OK, Colonel,” Zabitosky said “ tomorrow morning, I’m going back in there with nothing but three Americans and three Yards, some body bags and ammunition. And if you would like your first tour of Laos, seeing as you have not been to Laos, I want you on the lead ship with me.” The Colonel went along but tried to scrub the insert when they took ground fire; Zabitosky already had talked with the pilot, who disregarded the colonel’s pleas. After all, Zabitosky was the operation commander, not the colonel. The colonel did not get off the helicopter with the recon team. But miraculously, another circle Queen-Bee spotted the missing One-One, Pilton, and extracted him. Meanwhile, Zabitoslky found the team’s back trail, followed it 600 yards to a hill crest, looked over and could see gear strew where the team had been overrun. A little farther on he found black streaks where a flamethrower had scorched the ground and trees, then just ahead something was smoldering., It turned his stomach.

The hideous, sadistic murder of an unarmed man surprised Zabitosky, who explained, “That was the first time I ever knew the NVA to do anything like that.” Several Montagnards lay there, too, burned to death. It was another dangerous day before Zabitosky got Miguez’s body out; enemy pressure was so great he had to abandon the Yard bodies. Chief SOG personally relieved the ‘bellicose colonel’. Paul Miguez, who displayed incredible courage while his captors burned him alive, was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. SOG recon team saw the Miguez incident as proof of what lay in store for them if captured alive; such inhumanity was borne out again and again, with particular confirmation coming from the June 1967 Hatchet Force raid in target Oscar-Eight [ forward operational Base 559 Group]. And another story like below: “….Lieutenant Jerson was carried on; Howard was so drained that he was almost hallucinating. He laid there, silent, holding Jerson and puffing a cigarette a door gunner had given him. One pilot leaned back to give him a reassuring pat, but in his mind Howard kept seeing bodies falling, left behind, bodies of gallant Montagnards that he’d tried so hard to bring out. Almost out of his mind, Howard thought about killing the pilot though he knew that was not right and he didn’t have a weapon. Then, mercifully, he passed out. He awoke briefly in a field hospital to find his hands bandaged, his face covered with ointment, and learned Lieutenant Jim Jerson had died. But nobody could tell Jerson’s family or Robert Scherdin’s family that good men had not given their all for them. The recon company commander, Captain Ed Lesesne wrote Howard up for the Medal of Honor for the third time. There would be no downgrading, no minimizing his role to make a superior sound braver, just the truth. By the time Howard at last received the pale blue-ribbon American patriotism had plunged to its nadir and in the antiwar mood of the times.
The media told no one of his indomitable courage. The networks and major newspapers did not report the ceremony. It was as if it did not happen. In 1955, every school-kid knew Alvin York’s and Audie Murphy’s names. In 1970, no one had ever heard of Bob Howard’s valiant deeds, though his body bore more scars than Navy, Lieutenant John F Kerry, leader activist of antiwar movement with three awards of the Purple Heart for his service in Mekong-Delta combat, but no bleeding, no scars, and no a minute in hospital as Senator Bob Dole said;(Kerry met a criteria requirement such as graduated at Yale university in the prejudice of the First Skull and Bones generation [W A Harriman] and the Second one {George H W Bush] He was selected by them. Thereby upon his return, based on his strong feelings that his fighting men were being sacrificed for a mission in which all generals get lost the objectives, so no longer believed. However he voluntary involved in the effort of veterans to stop the war; it’s also based axiom three that explained the war-solution from earlier 1960 in all universities) . Not surprisingly POW were still imprisoned in the Hanoi Hilton at that time, took a dim view of his antiwar activities. Where they were held, beaten, and tortured for years. They were the honor soldiers, much of that time served after they refused to accept freedom on terms that violated the POW code of honor governing the order of prisoner releases. Howard chest more true values-decorations than either of these acclaimed heroes. Altogether, Howard served five tours in Vietnam, mostly in SOG, never once shrinking from the sound of guns. “Whenever someone asks me that day why I volunteer engaged to become Project-Delta Force, Flight Queen-Bee Group Commander, SO.,

I tell them, it was for the honor of having served beside such SOG’ gallant men…as Bob Howard!” So who brought our Americans fellows in arms having the feeling self-loathing Americans, and the false guilt about the noble cause of the Vietnam War? You sho e recognized who when you finished this “The New Legion” master piece. (Haunting memories of brave comrades, by Stryker Meyer North County Times staff writer, served in the Special Forces from 1968 to 1970) When I die, if the Lord gives me a moment to reflect before I breathe, my first thoughts will be not of my loved ones, nor my children. I’ll reflect on and thank God for Sáu, Hiệp, Phước, Tuấn, Hùng, Sơn, Quang, Châu, Cầu, and Minh. Captains Tưởng and Thinh and lieutenants Trung and Trọng will follow them in my thoughts. Then, I’ll think of my loving wife, our talented and unique children, andour folks. Why the Vietnamese men before my loved ones? Without the courage, strength and fearless verve as combatants in America’s secret war in Southeast Asia, I wouldn’t have returned to the United States. To day, on the 25th anniversary of the fall of Saigon, I’ll pause to salute those warriors , men most Americans will never hear about, including the more than 3 millions U.S troops sent to South Vietnam during America’s longest and costliest war.

There are many who do not respect or salute the Vietnamese who fought in Vietnam. That’s because our country has failed to educate them about the Vietnamese, the country they sent us to and its history and customs. As Green-Berets, we fought side by side with them, laughed with them and learned about theirs families, their dreams and hopes and fears. The first group was members of Spike-Team Idaho, a reconnaissance team that ran classified missions into Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam under the aegis of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group …SOG. Green-Berets, Navy SEALs and US Marine Corps Force Reconnaisance troops manned several special operation commands throughout South Vietnam. I joined Spike Team Idaho in May 1968, after six members of the team disapperated in a Laos target area. Three U.S Green Berets and three Vietnamese mercenaries were never heard from again and remain listed as missing in action today. By ’68, Idaho operated out of Phú Bài, 10 miles south of Hue. In May, there were 30 recon-teams there. By November, Idaho was the only operational team left in camp. The enemy troops in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam were well-trained, fearless and well-equipped. Captain Tưởng and Thinh and Lieutenants Trung and Trọng were helicopters pilots who flew Sikorsky H-34, which we called “QUEEN-BEES,” into landing zones where enemy soldiers tried to knock them out the sky. For several months in ’68, the Queenbees were the only aircraft flying SOG teams “across the fence” deep into enemy territory. In Laos, the CIA estimated there were between 30.000 and 40.000 North Vietnamese troops keeping the Ho Chi Minh Trail open, bringing supplies from the north to South Vietnam… and fighting SOG troops. During my 17 months on Idaho, we always left targets under heavy fire from North Vietnamese troops. The ride home was in Queenbees and every time we asked for one, it came, regardless of enemy fire. There are many Green-Berets alive today thank to the incredible flying skills of Vietnamese Queenbee- pilots. And without the Vietnamese or Montagnards team members, there would have been more than the 161 killed in SOG operations. Sáu was the Vietnamese team leader on Spike Team Idaho. When I landed at Phú-Bài, Sáu had been fighting for Special Forces nearly five years. Weighing less than 100 pds soaking wet, Sáu had a remarkable sixth nense: He could smell the enemy. In the jungle he moved with complete stealth and silence, often cursing his larger American counterparts. Hiệp was the team’s interpreter, who sometimes corrected U.S troops on their English, as well as speeking Vietnamese, French and some Chinese, Phước, Châu, Sơn and Hùng all signed up with Special Forces when they were 15 or 16. After hundreds of hours of intensive training, their age didn’t matter as they stood tall in combat. On October, 7, 1968, Spike Team Idaho, after trying to escape from North Vietnamese trackers, was attacked by NVA soldiers, who opened fire on full automatic. Sáu had warned they were near. Although none of the Americans heard anything; Sáu, Phước, Hiệp and Don-Wolken were on alert, with their weapons on full automatic, ready to go. In those firefights the first seconds are crucial. The submachine guns we carried fired 20 high-velocity rounds in ½ seconds. Sáu, Phước and Hiệp reloaded and drove the NVA back down the jungle-shrouded hill. We gained fire superiority, but the NVA never stopped coming at us. After a while, they were firing ar us from behind stacks of dead bodies. They came at us from 2. p.m until dusk, time and again rushing us, trying to overrun our position. We had Air Force Phantom jets, Skyraiders and helicopter gunships dropping bombs napalm and cluster bombs and make strafing runs. That was the first time I could recall smelling burnt human flesh. By dusk, we were low on ammo, hand grenades and rounds for our grenade laucher. Captain Thinh flew his H-34 to a slight rise above our position, hovering in deep elephant grass …thick-bladed grass that grew more than 12 feet tall. Because the grass was thick and NVA tried to close in on us again, it took us several minutes to get to the Queenbee.
When I arrived under it, I looked up at Captain Thinh, sitting there looking as calm as a Rocky Mountain breeze in springtime, and he smiled. Finally, we were loaded and he yanked us out of there. Sáu, Hiệp, Phước and I fired off our last magazine of rounds and threw our last grenades as we pulled out of the landing zone, again under heavy enemy fire. With a few minutes we were at 4.000 feet, returning to Phú-Bài. We were safe and unharmed. The Queenbee had 48 holes from bullets and grenades in its side panels and propellers.

The new American on the team quit the nextday. Sáu, Hiệp, and Phước are dinner before I arranged for Sáu and Hiệp to return to their families that night. That scene unfolded hundreds of times over the course of SOG’s history; I carry a deep, haunting guilt for having left them in South Vietnam . “Vocabularies, they absolutely fearless, and some SOG men said ‘It was really rough and tough and rugged… How tough? You could blow cylinders out of it and still get yourseft home’ Sadly, one thing extraordinary happened that it was 100% we got killed because the bad weather, none from enemy with cambat-bullets. But the ever-image of helicopter H-34 crewmembers “Missing In Action that flashed into my mind terrified me and I couldn’t hold my tear shed out because they were died but I was still survive, including Master Sergeant Ralph-Reno, Staff Sergeant Donald Fawcett and Officer Operation, Captain Edwin-Mc Namara… Meanwhile SOG’s MIA numbers continued to climb, especially on Harriman’s Super-Highway corridor. On 31 July 1969 a six man SOG team led by Captain Dennis Neal and Specialist Four Mike Burns, was overrun 20 miles into Laos, near Highway 921. When last heard, one man’s voice radioed, “Help...help…help….for God’s sake….help” Later, our Queen-Bee rescue team found no bodies, no sign of any kind. Then on 13, November 1969, on corridor of Harriman Highway as well, Staff Sergeant Ronald Ray, ‘One-Zero’, and Sergeant Randy Suber, ‘One-One’, were overrun 15 miles west of the Ashau-valley near Laotian Highway 923. Dead or alive, they were in enemy hands. The price was too high for the so called ‘verification check’ the craps: “I feel hatred towards the checking NVA presentation on Harriman Highway in his ambitious narrow interest stratagem.” By way of conclusion, I just determined that Harriman was working a scam, like some wicked wizard from a children’s fairy tale. DeLuca knew SOG’s attempts to ransom POWs. The most unfathomable impediments, Tony DeLuca thought, were political limitations that crippled POW recovery attempts in Laos and Cambodia. For instance, despite a friendly government taking power in Phnom Penh in 1970, U.S,-led SOG teams were not permitted to search Cambodia for POWs after the 30 June,1970, in post-invasion pull-out. Why? Even Harriman retired from a freewheeling diplomat 1969, but his next generation, wise-man George W.H Bush continued on course of his Eurasia Great Game’s stratagem that means still keeping untouched Ho Chi Minh Trail development in manpower and material military equipments build-up there. Naturally, the U.S embassy in Phnom Penh and the Joint Chiefs still reserved approval authority for any Cambodian Bright Light, but not a single U.S-led rescue mission was approved after 30 June 1970. And also the situation was hardly more accommodating for POW Bright Light into Laos. Since November 1969, the U.S ambassador required advance coordination for POW rescues beyond SOG’ 18-mile sector; records do not reflect how many requests were denied, but not a single SOG POW rescue mission was approved in Laos. The plight of the POWs and MIAs grew and grew on DeLuca’s conscience.


The truth was, he concluded, the United States was going through the motions but there was no high-level emphasis; no one would ever be retrieved. In this gut, DeLuca knew something had to be done. In the course of Vietnam War, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans pilots and crewmen had been shot down and captured by Communist North Vietnam. They had parachuted into the waiting arms of the Hanoi, crashed in Laos and been hunted down by the Pathet-Laos, endured years of torment in Hilton prison at Hanoi, and been used as pawns by the Soviets. Very few of them had escaped, few had lost their youth through years of captivity, and few had never come home. And from the moment of each one’s capture, each had surrendered his future to the unknown. None had known when or if they would see freedom again. On 18, February, 1971, the first of 6 SOG recon-teams inserted into the Ashau-valley to support of operation Lam Son 719, to tie down North VN forces and gather intelligence for when the ARVN returned along highway 922 coming out of Laos. Initially the Ashau diversion had been assigned to the 1st Brigade 101 Airborne division, which was to storm the Valley with four battalions, the specter of heavy American casualties apparently scotched that, instead a hand-full of recon-teams were giving job originally planned for a 2,000 men paratroop unit. (This genius Intelligence- War Strategy was repeated in WWII, the perfect coordination command and control between US Ambassador Averell Harriman to Soviet Union and Lieutenant William Colby in the Hot-Spot) The Ashau-valley had never been hotter. Captured documents revealed the North VN had moved 11 counter-recon- companies, there to reinforce Landing-Zone watcher, tracker-dogs rear security units and infantry battalions plus two antiaircraft battalions defended this area. Both SOG and the Air Force had suspected as much with USAF intelligence determining Oscar Eight contained the largest depot outside North Vietnam. Sergeant John Meyer who ran recon near Oscar Eight, recalled, “The area was really hot. I mean, every team that went in there got the shit shot out of it”. Just before the 1967 raid, U.S signal intelligence each day detected 2,300 radio messages emanating from there to North VN, a volume unparalleled throughout Laos. General Westmoreland believed an NVA Field Army headquarters that controlled all enemy operations in South Vietnam’s 1 Corps was located there.
Oscar Eight’s terrain favored the enemy, with the only suitable LZ in a wide bowl, surrounded by jungle high ground containing antiaircraft guns and bunkered infantry. The raid began with a dawn Arc Light by nine B.52s. Flying Covey, Master Sergeant Billy Waugh watched nearly a thousand 500 and 750-pound bombs walk across Oscar Eight, setting off 50 secondary explosions. Incredibly, the bombs had barely stopped falling when he could see NVA running from their shelters to roll fuel barrels away from a fire. Waugh radioed SOG Lieutenant Colonel Harold Rose at Khe-Sanh, “I’ve got people out here scurrying around. That sonvabitch is loaded” As the smoke cleared… Another Arc Light B.52 struck a cargo ammunition depot at the low-level of limestone “Co-Roc” setting off 2 hours secondary explosions.

This is a great NVA command and Control sanctuary headquarter got hit at limestone Co-Roc, creating non communication for two weeks and less-pressure at Khe Sanh at least in during the lunar-Tet. Those craps of Arc Light by 9 B.52 carpeted bombardment on 9 August, 1968 on Oscar-Eight, just damaged few cargo supplies; however no one human-being get hurt thank to Soviet camouflage fishing boat transmitting advance alert message to this headquarter, according to ROE craps. I considered that a “Non-Vulnerable Bomb-Game”. In turn of Soviet’s subordinate [North Vietnam] launched 107 or 122 mm Katyusha rockets, for instant at Danang Air Base. The house-wife of my Airmen family quarters, they had felt a Germany hospital ship “Helgolan” likely a key symbol referee for the “launching rockets-game”. One certain day, when hospital ship Helgolan was leaving Danang harbor to the ocean; they were sure 100% that night Communist Hanoi launching rockets to Danang Air Base. And at the morning of that day, at the breakfast time, some high speaker in U.S Main-Compound was echoed lousy some noise that they didn’t know what the hell’s means. However, they were waiting until at 4 or 5 PM of that day, they came to harbor Danang, if Helgolan ship leaving, they’d hurry up returned to the Air base and harangued to their husbands: “To night! Viet Cong launched rockets to our base, I must escaped in snatching all children to down town if you don’t scare O.K, staying here and died!!!” They’re right, before that happened, about 15 minutes, high speaker at Main Compound once again repeated many time and let G.I have known, having enough time. And how many rockets will hit; but according ROE, there was never more than 50 rockets for every launch-craps- event. Peering through the mist of fog, two helicopter H.34 looking like two whale have been sleeping, for sunbath on the grassy flat slope, their bodies sweated all over with morning moisture from the atmosphere condensed into drop on the cold aluminum camouflage surface. From our shelter-tents, on proceeding to the helipad through the haze dimness visibility, I could see our crew-chiefs busy scurrying around with their maintenance duties. Master Sergeant Mai was busy with his grease gun; he greased the main rotor component; meanwhile Sergeant Vang hand-pumped to refill all tanks. Apparently, we couldn’t care about flying safety operation because a special secret infiltration.

However I reminded Vang must leave a quantity of fuel at the bottom of each fuel-barrel due to water subsided. “Hey Vang! Did you check these expired date of six fuel barrels on this 4/4 truck?” I said. “Yes I did…and the suction-tube of hand pump wouldn’t reach to the bottom, it have a foot above the bottom for safety…no sweat I take care of it, sir!” Vang wore black-pajama garb of peasant made from Okinawa, that remind me in 1962 when we came here [Khe Sanh] all flight crewmembers must worn those black-pajama garb; had turned in their dog-tags, military I.D cards of South Vietnam, even their U.S, cigarettes, which were replaced by Asian brands, absolutely none carrying with U.S weapon made. All crewmembers equipped with Swedish K submachine guns and Belgian-made Browning 9mm pistols, all of which, of course, had been acquired clandestinely so a serial-number check would lead nowhere. And in down-cabin was equipped with one packet of explosive C-4 for self destroying helo when emergency forced landing. Why? Why? Because we worked with a clandestine agency called “Combined Area Studies”. As you see above, Harriman was stubbornly protected a commencing developed HCM Trail with P.O.L parallel. Now, another thing different is in the map geographic named Khe Sanh replaced instead of Huong-Hoa county in the past, its belonging to territory of Quang-Tri province. Population over here [Khe-Sanh] was about 3,000, the most were French coffee planters, habitation along Route 9; but in-fact due to not security, the Diem regime would evacuated them to safety area along Mieu-Giang River to La-Vang Catholic-hamlet, belonging Quang Tri territory as well. I saw Vang look like just get out from the river, he sweat too much from his hair to forehead, all over his eyes like just crying. “Stop pumped! Relax for a while I help you pumped it” I said “For save time and save fuel, I told Lt Hue and Lt Khoi should refill at Dong-Ha for sparing a quantity fuel over-here.” I must have a short briefing to Master Sergeant Donald Duncan and Lieutenant Nha from LLDB [Vietnamese Green beret] I said “All of you must check sure your harness-belt secure while you hanging out of the chopper for snapshot pictured. After take off , I must practiced a ‘Lazy-Eight’ like U-turn but not really U-turn, because we don’t have enough horizontal space for U-turn, around over-there just were stone shield hewn from solid rock both side like giant-tall walls along of large spring, like we are concealed in deep of a canyon, Tam-Boi’s mountain. Thereby only one alternative is vertical I-turn when we couldn’t go ahead because it would crash into the shield rock-wall. I deadly certain sure with all of you that the above us, there’re all belt antiaircraft artilleries ready for shooting down any aircraft flyover. We used tactical flight as the small fishes hidden in the bottom coral sharp rock.


This is only way for survive, rather got hit surrounded by jungle high ground containing antiaircraft guns and bunkered infantry!” “Now Hue and Khoi take-off right away, I will… after 20 minutes. When you all set refueling at Dong-Ha trying contact with us on frequencies…FM…, VHF…, and UHF at guard frequency, Lt Hao my copilot take care of it …if have you any question…Ah one more thing…always radio on even though grounded for refueling at Quang Ngai.” Sergeant Vang recheck for armament, a Queen-Bee H.34 carried a single rusty World War II, belt-fed 30 caliber machine gun hung from a bungee cord in the doorway with a thousand rounds stacked in a old can under the crew-chief’s seat. The H.34 had only one door on the right side, which made it relatively blind on its left, especially to the rear. When enemy A.K 47 bullets slugs hit its carvernous troop compartment, it sound like a wash tub being beaten with a base ball bat; but this tub could take a lot of hits…still O K, as flight crewmember of Project-Delta, this time we are equipped with Carabin M.2 instead of Swedish K submachine guns; meanwhile Duncan equipped with A.R.15, much lighter and more power ammunitions. Because He was tall and strong, so he carrying so much stuffs on his harness belt, more cartridge magazines than anyone, plus flashlight, binocular, maps, first-aid-kit…and camouflage-scarf showed-up his handsome to enemy. Last year, I was checked out by Master Sergeant Donald-Duncan. Duncan and Captain Richarson, J.3 Operation of 1st Observation Group Commandos to explore the growing Ho Chi Minh Trail for becoming a Flight-Group- Leader of Project-Delta Forces. I recalled this very Master-Sergeant Duncan, specialist instructor selected me become the leader, due to recently all my fellow senior pilots were washed-out because to much hesitation and so much safety flying. During two weeks checking-out operational flight-maneuvers. At western area of Dong Ba Thin Camp, Nha Trang were the mountainous, jungle-covered terrain, natural clearings for helicopter landing zones were scarce and likely don’t have any in the most crest-ridge of mountain. Suddenly, while flying, in down cabin, Captain Richarson radioed “infiltration right here”. I didn’t see any LZ available around, my spontaneous reflection, quickly I idled the engine RPM, made a spin autorotation with steep descendent…at last, I made accuracy precise ‘quick stop’ and putting one wheel right landing gear on a big rock, meanwhile left landing gear and tail wheel agitated in the air. I still keep high power 2,800 RPM about 10 second, I hear the echoed voice from Richarson: “Touch and go 10 seconds that’s good enough, We go home now”. Shortly, I was passed this tough-hard flight examination. From now on the 1st Observation Group Commandos in Project Delta put my nickname “The Cowboy Pilot”.


John Stryker Myer stand (row) frist on the left
Hiep sit (row) on the right

Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Vụ chiếc UH-1 bị đánh cắp tại Ðà Lạt 1973


Hồ Duy Hùng là ai?


Thiên Ân.

Vụ chiếc trực thăng UH-1H mang số 60-139 của Phi đoàn 219 bị đánh cắp tại Ðà Lạt năm 1973, trong Không Quân hầu như mọi người đều biết và dân chúng Sàigòn cũng được đọc tin tức trên báo chí thời đó.


Kẻ đánh cắp chiếc trực thăng nói trên là Hồ Duy Hùng, cựu Thiếu Uý Không Quân VNCH, sau khi thụ huấn ở Hoa Kỳ trở về, bị An Ninh KQ khám phá có thân nhân đi theo địch nên tên Hùng đã bị sa thải khỏi Quân Ðội. Sau này, bộ máy tuyên truyền của Việt cộng nói rằng Hùng là người của chúng được gài vào Không Quân VNCH để làm nội tuyến. Tuy nhiên đã có nhiều yếu tố khách quan cho thấy thoạt tiên Hùng chỉ là một tay bất mãn, đánh cắp máy bay để trả thù việc mình bị sa thải khỏi Quân Ðội, để rồi mãi về sau này trở thành một người hùng bất đắc dĩ của "Cách mạng"!


Ðể chứng minh cho lập luận nói trên, thiết nghĩ chúng tôi chỉ cần nêu ra hai sự kiện:
*Sự tuyên dương muộn màng:
Khác với Nguyễn Thành Trung - kẻ đã lái F-5 dội bom xuống Dinh Ðộc Lập, cũng như rất nhiều tên nội tuyến, nằm vùng khác đã được tô son trét phấn để tuyên dương sau ngày "Cách mạng thành công", Hồ Duy Hùng cho mãi đến năm 2000 mới được báo chí "quốc doanh" ở Sàigòn đề cập tới: Bán Nguyệt San Thanh Niên với bài: "Người hùng lặng lẽ", tờ Phụ Nữ Chủ Nhật với bài: "Vụ đánh cắp chiếc trực thăng UH-1...", và bài "Từ vụ án chiếc trực thăng UH-1" kéo dài 12 ngày trên một tờ báo nọ.


Nếu không kể tới những chi tiết "chửi cha nhau" trong ba bài báo nói trên, thì độc giả được biết đại khái (theo lời kể của Ðại tá Quân báo VC Lê Nam Hà và được phóng viên "xào nấu" laị) thì Hồ Duy Hùng (bí danh là Chính), trước kia hoạt động trong phong trào sinh viên học sinh tại Quy Nhơn, sau Mậu Thân 1968 vào Sàigòn và được Việt cộng móc nối kết nạp vào "Quân báo đặc khu Sàigòn-Gia Ðịnh".


Sau khi đánh cắp chiếc trực thăng bay về "mật khu", Hùng và Nguyễn Tường Long, một cán bộ Không Quân VC được gửi tới để tháo gỡ chiếc trực thăng chuyển ra miền Bắc. Tại Sơn Tây hai người này ráp trở lại và bay thử thành công. Sau đó cả hai trở lại miền Nam hoạt động, còn chiếc trực thăng thì được xử dụng trong viện huấn luyện phi công Bắc Việt.
Nguyễn Tường Long, nguyên là một kỹ sư gốc Việt kiều (cha Việt, mẹ Pháp) ở Lyon - Pháp; sau tình nguyện về nước tham gia "Cách mạng". Ðiều đáng lưu ý là khi các báo nói trên đồng loạt khai thác vụ "đánh cắp trực thăng" này thì Nguyễn Tường Long đã chết. Từ đó đưa câu hỏi: phải chăng vì "chiến sĩ quân báo Hồ Duy Hùng" chỉ là câu chuyện bịa đặt cho nên phải đợi tới lúc một trong hai vai chính về chầu "bác" thì mới dám "phịa"?


Hỏi tức là trả lời. Và chỉ có câu trả lời đó mới có thể giải thích tại sao sau ngày 30/4/1975, CSVN không rầm rộ tuyên dương "người hùng" Hồ Duy Hùng mà phải đợi đến 15 năm sau? Xét về công trạng, việc "đánh cắp một chiếc trực thăng ngay trước mũi địch rồi chuyển ra miền Bắc" (nguyên văn trên báo VC) của Hồ Duy Hùng nếu không hơn thì cũng phải bằng vụ dội bom Dinh Ðộc Lập của Nguyễn Thành Trung!


Hiện nay "đồng chí" Hồ Duy Hùng đang giữ một chức vụ khiêm nhượng: Giám Ðốc Công Ty Du Lịch Phú Thọ!

*Bị phòng không Việt Cộng bắn:
Theo lời kể của Ðại tá Quân báo VC Lê Nam Hà thì việc Hồ Duy Hùng đánh cắp trực thăng bay về đáp ở đồn điền cao su Dầu Tiếng, thuộc mật khu Lộc Ninh là "nằm trong kế hoạch", và các đơn vị địa phương đã được Bộ chỉ huy Miền thông báo trước để chuẩn bị đón "người chiến sĩ phi công anh hùng". Thế nhưng trên thực tế thì...


"Thấy máy bay địch bay về căn cứ của ta, các chiến sĩ giải phóng bắn lên. Máy bay bị trúng nhiều vết đạn nhưng ghế ngồi của phi công có tấm chắn phòng đạn nên ông Hồ Duy Hùng không bị thương. Ông hạ thấp độ bay phòng đạn và đã đáp xuống rất chính xác trong một bãi không rộng lắm dưới rừng cao su." (Nguyên văn trên báo Thanh Niên).
Theo báo Phụ Nữ Chủ Nhật thì lúc đó Hùng liên lạc với điện đài đơn vị (của VC) không được là vì "đồng chí trực điện đài đột ngột bỏ đi uống nước"!!!


Tác giả hai bài báo nói trên - Mạc Ðại và Nguyễn Phương Thảo - cho biết họ viết " theo lời kể của Ðại tá Nguyễn Nam Hà - nguyên phó giám đốc Quân báo Sàigòn & Gia Ðịnh và đồng chí Hồ Duy Hùng tức Chính", nhưng giữa hai bài báo đã có nhiều chi tiết mâu thuẫn tới mức không thể chấp nhận. Chẳng hạn, trong khi Mạc Ðại của báo Thanh Niên viết rằng chiếc UH-1 nói bị trúng đạn, sau khi được tháo gỡ, vận chuyển ra phi trường Hòa Lạc ở Sơn Tây (miền Bắc) thì "Từ Hà Nội, Trung đoàn Không Quân Vận Tải đã phải điều tới một xe công trình có đủ phương tiện sửa chữa và một toán cơ khí...", thì Nguyễn Phương Thảo của báo Phụ Nữ lại viết "... Sau khi kiểm tra chiếc máy bay, Ban Quân Báo tiếp tục phân công Chính (H.D.Hùng) nhiệm vụ mới là dùng máy bay mang bom thả vào Dinh Ðộc Lập đúng vào 9 giờ sáng ngày 1 tháng 1 năm 1974 là ngày mà Thiệu và nội các tụ tập đón mừng năm mới. Bom đã được đặt làm, Chính cũng đã chuẩn bị các phương tiện kỹ thuật để thực hiện nhiệm vụ. Nhưng đến giờ phút chót, cấp trên đề nghị hủy bỏ kế hoạch này và thay vào đó là một nhiệm vụ khác" (tháo gỡ để mang về Bắc).


Việc để "mất cắp" một chiếc phi cơ để cuối cùng lọt vào tay địch là một việc đáng trách - và rất đáng buồn khi người chịu trách nhiệm lại là một trong những cấp chỉ huy đáng kính phục nhất là trong ngành trực thăng - Cố Trung Tá Nguyễn Văn Nghĩa. Tuy nhiên Lý Tưởng Úc Châu nhắc lại chuyện cũ không với mục đích chê trách người đã khuất mà chỉ để mọi người được biết rõ về một biến cố trong quân chủng (cũng như số phận của chiếc trực thăng mang số đuôi 60-139) - hiện đang được các nhà báo của chế độ CSVN thêu dệt và khai thác - một cách trâng tráo và rẻ tiền.
Tiếp theo chúng tôi xin giới thiệu tới chiến hữu KQ và độc giả bài tường thuật của một người trong cuộc, đó là anh cơ phi (cơ khí phi hành) của chiếc trực thăng ttrong phi vụ nói trên.

* * *

Vụ mất máy bay trực thăng UH-1 số 60139 - Ngày 7 tháng 11 năm 1973

Sáng sớm ngày 6 tháng 11 năm 1973, Thiếu Tá Huỳnh Xuân Thu gặp tôi và nói "Chú về sửa soạn đi bay Quảng Ðức ngay, nhớ mang theo đồ ngủ đêm". Tôi chộp vội bộ đồ nhái, cái mền dù và trang bị vệ sinh cá nhân cùng một bộ Domino, sau đó tôi theo Anh Thu và Trung Tá Nguyễn Văn Nghiã (Phi đoàn trưởng) ra kiểm tàu số đuôi139 để bay đi Quảng Ðức thăm biệt đội đang biệt phái tại đây.


Khi đến nơi, Chi khu trưởng thuộc tiểu Khu Phú Bổn tiếp đón rất niềm nở, phòng nghỉ của biệt đội và chi khu gần nhau nhưng lại xa sân bay: từ sân bay qua một con phố, xuống dốc rồi lại vòng lên nơi nghỉ ngơi của Biệt Ðội 219. Khí hậu ở đây ban ngày thì rất nóng nực nhưng ban đêm lại lạnh vô cùng vì chung quanh toàn là núi đá.
Anh Nghiã và Anh Thu đi thăm từng nơi ở và làm việc của Biệt Ðội, hỏi thăm tình hình cuộc sống ăn ở của anh em, sau đó anh muốn ở lại đêm để khích lệ tinh thần anh em. Chiều xuống, cái giá lạnh bắt đầu và rất buồn tẻ. Phố xá không có sự nhộn nhịp, người ta tụ tập ở nhà không muốn ra ngoài đường và trời càng lúc càng tối chỉ leo lét những bóng đèn vàng ố không đủ thắp sáng một căn phòng, vì vậy anh em biệt đội chỉ ngồi bù khú trong giây lát rồi tất cả đi ngủ. Nơi đây không có gường, chỉ có ghế bố xếp nhà binh và có đôi khi anh em phải ngủ chung một ghế bố vì không có đủ; cũng may vì trời lạnh nên ngủ chung cũng không đến nỗi khó chịu.


Khoảng 10 giờ đêm, khi mọi người đã ngủ thì Chi Khu xuống báo địch quân hăm đánh vào chi khu và sân bay. Thế là toàn bộ anh em ra ứng chiến tại sân bay. Tất cả mở máy kiểm tra tình trạng phi cơ rồi tắt máy nghe Trung Tá Nghiã hướng dẫn bản đồ và phương hướng bay trong trường hợp chi khu bị overrun, sau đó ai nấy về tàu. Còn lại ba thầy trò chúng tôi trong tàu và một phi công nữa tôi quên tên ngồi chơi Domino, cứ chơi như vậy cho đến sáng. Ban đầu thì tôi thắng nhưng đến gần sáng thì Anh Nghiã gom sạch.


Sáng sớm hôm sau chúng tôi bay trở về Nha Trang, bay một đoạn Anh Nghiã nói " Thu, chú bay thử vào đám mây kia xem". Anh Thu bay vào khoảng 5 phút, Anh Nghiã bay ra lại và nói "Chú không chịu khó bay instrument, bay gì mà kỳ dzậy?". Rồi Anh Nghiã lại nói Anh Thu bay vào trong mây, rồi Anh Nghiã lại bay ra, mây mỏng cứ lấp phất lướt qua phi cơ. Sau đó Anh Nghiã lại nói Anh Thu bay vào cụm mây dầy kia thử xem, rồi càng lúc máy bay càng vào sâu trong mây, mây mỗi lúc một sậm lại, lúc này Anh Nghiã cầm control và anh nói huyên thuyên đủ thứ chuyện trên đời. Anh hỏi tôi:"Mẫn, chú thấy mây thế nào, mây màu gì kia?". Tôi lưỡng lự nhìn vào mây trước mặt và nói "Tôi thấy mây màu Hồng Trung Tá!". Anh Nghiã phá lên cười "Trời ơi! Thằng này Vertical quá rồi (ý nói Vertigo), cho chú cầm cần lái chắc chết hết anh em". Rồi anh quay sang Anh Thu cũng hỏi mây màu gì và anh cứ nói, chỉ dạy lung tung trong khi anh cứ tiếp tục bay trong mây, 15, 20, rồi 30 phút, anh vẫn bình tĩnh bay, phi cơ êm ru.


Gần một tiếng đồng hồ sau, Anh Nghiã thấy cây lờ mờ phía dưới, hỏi Anh Thu "Chú biết mình bay tới đâu rồi không?", Anh Thu chưa kịp đáp thì Anh Nghiã đã chỉ con đường ở phiá dưới nói là Ðơn Dương. Anh theo con đường đó bay đến Ðà Lạt với ý định thăm một nhân viên phi hành của 219 đang nghỉ dưỡng thương tại đây. Lúc 9 giờ sáng, phi cơ đáp xuống bờ hồ Xuân Hương bên cạnh nhà hàng Thủy Tạ, tôi cất hành trang của tôi vào sau tail cone, ngay chỗ oil cooler fan. Sau đó ba thầy trò đi vào tiểu khu Tuyên Ðức nhờ gởi phi cơ nhưng không gặp ALO, đại diện không quân ở đó, định bay vào sân bay Cam Ly nhưng từ đó lại không có phương tiện ra thành phố, hơn nữa lúc đó thời tiết quá xấu, bay vào đáp ở trung tâm Ðà Lạt là đã giỏi lắm rồi. Chúng tôi trở lại máy bay, ssau đó Anh Nghiã rủ lên nhà hàng Mekong uống cà phê và ăn sáng. Tôi xin Anh Nghiã cho về nhà vì nhà Bác tôi ở đối diện với cửa sau bên hông nhà hàng Mékong, thấy ngay sát bên, Anh Nghiã đồng ý cho tôi về nhà, hẹn khi nào về thì hai anh sẽ đến gọi.


Tôi ở nhà chơi và chờ các anh gọi bay về Nha Trang, nhưng mãi đến 1 giờ rưỡi trưa vẫn không thấy các anh đến gọi. Tôi chạy sang nhà hàng Mékong thì không thấy các anh đâu, Sau đó tôi nhờ Bác tôi chở ra nhà hàng Thủy Tạ chỗ đậu phi cơ, khi ra đến nơi thì không thấy phi cơ đâu cả, chạy qua sân vận động gần đó cũng không thấy. Tôi nghĩ chắc Anh Nghiã và Anh Thu đã bay về Nha Trang mà quên gọi tôi rồi, hay là không lẽ Trung Tá lại đến nhà Thượng Sĩ gọi đi bay?... Các câu hỏi chỉ quanh quẩn vào những điều vô lý đó, và tôi lại lo thêm nữa là khi Anh Nghiã và Anh Thu bay về thì đồ đạc của tôi dấu vào sau chỗ oil cooler fan lỡ cái mền dù hay bộ đồ nhái nó rơi ra và bị hút vào trong cánh quạt của oil cooler thì khổ! Rồi thắc mắc và lo âu cứ như thế dồn dập, rồi cái túi đựng helmet đã kép phẹc-mơ-tuya chưa?...Thật tình lúc đó tôi rất lo sợ, không sợ Anh Nghiã la rầy mà sợ lỡ phi cơ có bị gì thì sao? Hai anh có sao không?.


Tôi quay ngay ra bến xe đò mua vé trở về Nha Trang, dọc đường tôi rất lo lắng và mệt mỏi, rồi gục trên ghế trước ngủ thiếp đi, lát sau giật mình thấy có người nắm tay tôi, tỉnh lại thấy tay mình để trên đùi cô gái ngồi bên cạnh, cô cầm tay tôi để nhẹ qua đùi tôi. Tôi quê quá, vội vàng xin lỗi cô, cô nói thấy tôi có vẻ bồn chồn lo lắng. Cô gái cởi mở và thật có duyên với đôi răng khểnh dễ thương. Tôi quên hết mọ bồn chồn lo lắng, bắt đầu tấn công cô gái, suốt chặng đường chúng tôi đã quen nhau, khi về đến Nha Trang chúng tôi cùng đi ăn và Hường tên cô bé, đã cho tôi địa chỉ hẹn ngày hơm sau tôi sẽ đến tìm.


Khi về đến trại Hàm Tử khu gia binh của phi đoàn 219, lúc đó khoảng 7 giờ rưỡi tối, Hồng "già" chặn tôi lại hỏi: "Mày có biết gì không? Mày bay của mày bị mất cắp rồi", tôi chỉ cười vì cho đây là lời đùa, và như vậy là Anh Nghiã, Anh Thu đã về rồi, tôi thấy yên trí hơn. Sau đó tôi gặp Trần Mạnh Khiêm, nó nói: "Mày về phi đoàn đi, máy bay bị mất rồi, để tao chở mày vô!". Mọi người đều nói một cách nghiêm trang như vậy nghiã là có thật. Lúc này tôi không còn hoang mang nữa, chẳng hiểu vì sao, không thấy sợ, không thấy lo nghĩ, cứ dửng dưng như không có chuyện gì cả. Có lẽ vì mấy chữ "mất máy bay" hay "mấy cắp máy bay" nó không có trong tự điển lưu trữ trong đầu tôi, thành ra đầu tôi cứ trống rỗng. Cũng có thể chỉ số thông minh của tôi thấp, không biết suy nghĩ và không biết phản ứng như thế nào, hoặc vì tôi mệt lả cả người?...


Vừa về tới cửa phòng trong trại Bắc Bình Vương định lấy chìa khoá mở cửa phòng thì có hai Trung Sĩ Không Quân ngồi trên xe Ford Pick-up chờ sẵn ở đó, họ lại chào và hỏi tôi:"Xin lỗi có phải Thượng Sĩ Mẫn không ạ?". Tôi trả lời ngay: :"Vâng, tôi đây". Một trong hai người nói:"Chúng tôi mời Th/sĩ lên Phòng An Ninh có việc cần". Tôi trả lời:"Tôi vừa mới về, các anh có thể cho tôi tắm một cái rồi tôi lên ngay". Nhân viên an ninh trả lời:"Không có gì đâu, Th/Sĩ lên một chút xíu rồi về tắm cũng được mà". Mặc dù mệt mỏi tôi cũng phải lên Phòng An Ninh, việc đầu tiên là họ phủ đầu tôi trước, đưa tôi vào căn phòng 12 mét vuông, cửa sổ bị đóng bít lại bằng ván ép dằn từ phía bên ngoài, không có đèn điện.


Một lát sau họ quăng vào một cái chiếu đơn và 4 cây đèn cầy của em bé đốt đèn Trung Thu, rồi khoảng 15 phút sau, họ đứng bên ngoài quăng vào cái bô nhôm, nghe một cái cảng, và cứ 15 phút họ lại mở cửa rọi đèn bin vào xem tôi có tự tử hay không?. Khoảng một tiếng rưỡi đồng hồ sau thì vị Ðại Úy An Ninh tôi quên mất tên, cho gọi tôi lên, lúc này khoảng 10 giờ đêm. Thấy điệu bộ của vị Ðại úy An Ninh, tôi hiểu ngay rằng nãy giờ họ làm như vậy là để hù họa tôi và cũng để câu giờ chờ sĩ quan đến thẩm vấn tôi.


Vị Ðại Úy nói:"Tôi biết Th/Sĩ chỉ là tép riu thôi, như vậy không có gì phải sợ, Th/Sĩ cứ trình bày mày bay rời Nha Trang lúc mấy giờ và đến Quảng Ðức làm gì, sau đó mấy giờ cất cánh và xuống Ðà Lạt lúc mấy giờ, và gặp ai, trông thấy ai, rồi đi về hướng nào, và cứ như thế cho đến khi Th/Sĩ khám phá ra mất máy bay". Rồi ông ta đưa cho tôi một xấp giấy bơ-luya và một cây bút bi, tôi cứ hí hoáy viết và kể lại toàn bộ những gì tôi biết được, theo dàn bài và cách thức sắp xếp của ông Ðại Úy đưa ra. Xong, vị Ðại Úy đọc lại rất cẩn thận, rồi đọc lại cho tôi nghe, sau đó nói là sai chưa đúng, bắt tôi khai lại và ông cất tờ kia đi. Cứ như thê nhiều lần... Cho đến 2, 3 giờ sáng, tay tôi cứng lại không còn viết được nữa, vị Ðại Úy mới cho tôi nghỉ và đưa về phòng giam.


Về phần Anh Nghiã và Anh Thu khi đến nhà Bác tôi gọi tôi đi về thì Bác tôi mới nói:"Nó ra chỗ đậu máy bay không thấy máy bay đâu cả, nó sợ các ông bỏ nó nên nó lên xe đò về Nha Trang rồi". Lúc đó hai anh mới hết hồn, nhờ Bác tôi lấy xe LaDaLat chở vô phi trường Cam Ly vẫn không thấy, sau Bác tôi đưa về Tiểu Khu Tuyên Ðức dò hỏi vẫn không ra, cuối cùng hai anh quyết định trình diện Tiểu Khu báo cáo sự việc và nơi đây Phòng An Ninh của Tiểu Khu đưa hai anh về Phòng An Ninh Không Quân Nha Trang ngày 8 tháng 11 năm 1973. Tại Nha Trang hai anh không bị giam giữ, hai anh ở nhà và nhân viên điều tra đến tận nhà làm việc.


Tôi bị giam như vậy lúc đầu tưởng về ngay nên tôi chỉ nhờ bạn đưa vào cái dù thả trái sáng để làm mùng, nhưng rồi vừa nóng vừa ngộp, tôi cứ lấy thuốc là châm thủng từ từ, lúc đầu lỗ nhỏ và ít, sau đó lỗ to và nhiều hơn, cuối cùng thì nó cũng như không vì chỗ nào cũng có muỗi. Còn ăn uống thì mỗi bữa nhờ nhân viên an ninh mua dùm ổ bánh mì và một bịch nước mía, còn bạn thì chẳng thấy ma nào dám bén mảng đến nữa, có lẽ họ sợ liên lụy chăng hay là Phòng An Ninh không cho thăm viếng?


Ăn bánh mì mãi không thể nuốt nổi, mà Phòng An Ninh không có quy chế ăn uống. Tôi phải tự túc mua ở ngoài, tưởng hết chịu nổi thì sau một tuần lễ, họ lại mời Thiếu Tá Thu vào ở chung với tôi, lúc đó họ mới cho khiêng hai cái gường sắt rồi đóng cửa lại. Lát sau, vị Ðại úy điều tra tôi vào xin lỗi:" Thiếu Tá thông cảm, tôi phải đóng cửa lại", Anh Thu tức giận:"Thiếu Tá cái gì, tao là thằng tù!", Ðại Úy An Ninh trả lời:"Lệnh trên chứ tôi đâu dám...", Anh Thu tức giận nhảy chồm tới:"Tao là thằng tù...", vị Ðại Úy nhảy vội ra ngoài và từ đó ngày đêm không đóng cửa nữa.


Rồi mỗi bữa Chị Thu mang vào hai phần cơm cho Anh Thu và cả cho tôi nữa, Chị còn làm một lon ghi-gô đậu phộng da cá cho Anh Thu nhưng anh không thích ăn nên giao cho tôi "xử lý" nó. Hai thầy trò được tự do đi lại, hay là ra ngoài sân hóng mát khi thoải mái.


Sau khi đối chiếu tất cả những lời khai của Anh Nghiã, Anh Thu và tôi, Phòng An Ninh Không Quân chuyển hồ sơ về Bộ Tư Lệnh Không Quân cho Trung Tướng Trần Văn Minh duyệt xét, sau đó chuyển lên cho Tổng Thống Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, xem xong Tổng Thống bác lời khai của chúng tôi. Thế là thấy trò chúng tôi phải khai lại, và cứ như thế khai đi khai lại cho đến lần thứ ba, Trung Tướng Trần Văn Minh tuyên bố ông đã duyệt xét theo hệ thống quân giai, nếu Tổng Thống còn bác nữa tức là không tín nhiệm ông sẽ từ chức, đồng thời Tổng Giám Mục Nguyễn Văn Bình cũng can thiệp yêu cầu Tổng Thống xét lại, cho tới lúc đó ông Thiệu mới chịu duyệt.


Hết tuần lễ thứ hai, họ đưa Anh Nghiã lên Phòng An Ninh làm thủ tục, xong xuôi họ giải cả ba thầy trò chúng tôi ra Ðại Ðội 24 Quân Cảnh Tư Pháp Nha Trang.


Cơ sở của Quân Cảnh Tư Pháp Nha Trang là một dãy nhà cất theo kiểu dã chiến của Pháp, các phòng làm việc thì bừa bộn, thiếu tiện nghi, hồ sơ để lung tung, nhưng cách làm việc có vẻ chuyên môn hơn Phòng An Ninh KQ Nha Trang. Khi chúng tôi đến nơi, một vị Ðại Úy chấp pháp lấy cung chúng tôi từng người một, và không như trong An Ninh KQ, ở đây họ hỏi theo thứ tự lớp lang và họ ghi chép lấy chứ không để chúng tôi tự ghi chép.


Anh Nghiã vào làm việc trước, sau đó đến Anh Thuột dãy nhà cất theo kiểu dacu sơ Trang 24 Quân Cảnh Tư Pha. cuối cùng mới đến tôi. Sau khi Anh Nghiã ra, Anh Thu vào làm việc. Vị Ðại Úy chấp pháp lấy cung rất là lâu nên tôi có hơi bồn chồn, và có vẻ buồn buồn ưu tư. Anh Nghiã thấy vậy nói:"Này cái thằng chết nhát, có ai khai cho chú đâu mà cái vẻ mặt lo lắng, lo sợ vậy hả?... Xem anh đây này, sự nghiệp, địa vị, danh vọng, vợ con... mất hết mà anh có lo lắng điều gì đâu, sự việc đã xảy ra rồi thì điều gì đến nó sẽ đến, có lo lắng cách nào thì nó cũng phải đến vậy thôi..."


Rồi việc lấy cung của chúng tôi cũng kéo dài đến chiều, xong họ sắp xếp chỗ nghỉ ngơi cho chúng tôi. Vì ở đây chỉ có phòng tạm giam, mà phòng tạm giam thì toàn là lính "trời ơi" không thôi, nào là xì-ke, ăn cắp, hiếp dâm, đào ngũ, đánh lộn .v..v.., mà phòng thì chỉ là cái cũi làm bằng vỉ sắt phi trường, chung quanh trống trơn, mái cũng bằng vỉ sắt, nếu mưa thì chịu trận vậy thôi. Vì không có chỗ giam riêng chúng tôi nên buộc lòng họ phải nhường ba cái gường sắt của họ cho ba thầy trò chúng tôi nằm, còn họ nằm dưới đất. Sau năm ngày đúc kết hồ sơ thụ lý của chúng tôi, họ đưa Anh Nghiã vô Quân lao còn Anh Thu và tôi được cho về. Lúc này tôi mới nhớ tới cô bé tên Hường mà tôi mới chỉ nắm tay được trước đó 20 ngày. Tôi lục tìm địa chỉ mà em cho tôi, nó thất lạc mất rồi, tôi tiếc ngẩn người, đã hụt mất một nàng thật dễ mến và đáng yêu.


Vài ngày sau, tôi vào Quân Lao Nha Trang thăm Anh Nghiã. Trông thấy tôi, anh nói đùa:"Cái thằng chết nhát, mày vô đây làm gì, họ bắt nhốt mày bây giờ". Tư cách của anh thật ung dung. Tôi đưa cho anh quyển "Papillon" (Người tù khổ sai), anh phì cười khi thấy tựa cuốn truyện. Và anh kể cho tôi biết ngày anh vô đây, gặp một tên "Ðại bàng" trong tù, khi hắn ta biết anh là phi đoàn trưởng phi đoàn 219, hắn kính phục anh ngay, vì hắn cũng là một quân nhân, đã từng nghe những huyền thoại về 219. Ngoài đời hắn là một tay anh chị khét tiếng ở Nha Trang, và hắn đã có lần đụng độ với những tay lì lợm của 219 vào những năm 1968-69, khi phi đoàn chưa dời về Nha Trang (hình như hắn là kẻ đã chém lầm vào tay anh Châu Lương Cang tại Bar số 1). Gặp Anh Nghiã hắn nể phục ngay và ra lệnh cho đàn em phục vụ Anh Nghiã mọi nhu cầu. Hắn tuyên bố với các đàn em rằng Anh Nghiã là một "Ðại ca giang hồ trí thức" của hắn. Về phần Anh Nghiã, sau này cứ mỗi tháng hay vài tuần là Ðại Tá Lạc hay Chuẩn Tướng Lượng lại bảo lãnh cho về phép...


Ðến tháng 5 năm 1974,Anh Thu và tôi được Tòa Án Quân Sự Nha Trang mời ra làm việc và mọi sự lại khai lại như ban đầu. Sau đó, trong phiên tòa xử ngày 12 tháng 7, Anh Nghiã bị tuyên án "8 tháng tù ở, kể từ ngày bị bắt giam".


Phiên tòa kết thúc, mọi người chạy lại chúc mừng anh vì anh đã trong quân lao 9 tháng, quá thời gian tòa tuyên án. Từ đó anh về nhà luôn.


Trong năm 1974, không ai cắt tôi đi bay nữa, chỉ trực tại phi đoàn. Lúc này Anh Huỳnh Văn Phố lên làm quyền Phi Ðoàn Trưởng, sau hoán chuyển với phi đoàn trưởng 253 ngoài Ðà Nẵng là Thiếu Tá Phạm Ðăng Luân về làm Phi Ðoàn Trưởng 219, Anh Huỳnh Xuân Thu làm Phi Ðoàn Phó, Anh Trần Ngọc Thạnh làm Sĩ Quan Huấn Luyện, Anh Phạm Ngọc Sâm làm làm Trưởng Phòng Hành Quân. Buổi đầu, Anh Sâm cắt bay không để ý đến sự trùng hợp tên tuổi của nhân viên trong phi đoàn nên có vài việc buồn cười xảy ra như khi cắt một phi hành đoàn biệt phái đi Ban Mê Thuột, anh đã ghi trên bảng phi lệnh;"PHÐ: Bơ - Ðường - Xả -Cải" (Phan Công Bơ, Trưởng phi cơ - Lý Bổn Ðường, Hoa tiêu phó - Hồ Văn Xả, Mevo - Lê Văn Cải, Xạ thủ), thế là mọi người được một mẻ cười vì nguyên phi hành đoàn toàn đồ ăn, không sợ đói. Sau anh cắt một phi hành đoàn cũng bay đi Ban Mê Thuột, sáng ra các anh thấy tên của phi hành đoàn này thì đều rụng rời tay chân: "Kiệt - Lực - Quan - Tài" (Võ Tấn Kiệt, TPC - Nguyễn Hùng Lực, HTP - Nguyễn Văn Quan, Mevo - Nguyễn Văn Tài, Xạ thủ), không anh nào chịu bay cả. Anh Sân phải cắt bay lại với các tên khác các anh mới đi bay...


Minh Mẫn 219